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The Iranian Economy in the 1970s: 
Examination of the Nugent Thesis 
Robert E. Looney and P. C. Frederiksen 
Despite many optimistic predictions, the post-war economic growth enjoyed 
by developed countries has not spilled over to developing countries. In fact, 
a widening gap between per capita incomes has taken place over the last thirty 
years. 1 Growth rates in developing countries have often been quite dismal 
and their rates of growth have varied significantly more than those of the more 
advanced countries. Iran was an exception to the norm for developing 
countries sustaining high and growing rates of real economic growth after its 
stabilization program of the early 1960s. 
Iran's industrial sector lost its earlier dynamism by the late 1970s, and des-
pite some growth in the agricultural sector, the economy began to experience 
severe stagnation. Two alternative explanations are possible to account for 
the slowdown. On the one hand, it can be attributed to short-run 
phenomena - largely political in nature. 2 On the other hand, the slowdown 
can be viewed as a direct result of the import substitution policies which 
had been adopted by the government to enable the manufacturing sector to 
'catch up'. 
This paper examines the major mechanisms which led to the demise of the 
Iranian economy. First, we identify some of the more important economic 
trends at work before and after the oil price increases of 1973. Despite the 
aggregate nature of the data, several patterns suggest the broad forces underly-
ing Iran's growth and decline. Second, we examine the Nugent thesis as 
described below in the context of Iran to see why the momentum of growth 
which was established in the 1960s did not carry forward into the 1970s as 
Nugent's thesis would suggest. 
SECTORAL GROWTH PATTERNS 
Four distinct patterns of sectoral growth developed in Iran between 1960 and 
1977:3 (i) a sharp declne in the growth of the agricultural sector from 33.3 
per cent of non-oil GDP in 1959 to 13. 7 per cent in 1977, (ii) erratic rates in 
the construction industry, (iii) a steady growth in the manufacturing sector, 
and (iv) the expansion of public services over private services. In a broader 
context, one can compare Iran's output by sector with the 'normal' output 
pattern (as defined by Chenery") for countries with similar per capita incomes 
and population. While close to normal for most sectors of the economy, 
Table 1 indicates that by 1970 the manufacturing sector despite having grown 
quite rapidly, still fell far short of what might be considered the norm for 
countries in a like position. • 
The low proportion of manufacturing output is consistent with the findings 
of Chenery and Taylor. 5 They interpret this pattern to be the result of many 
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resource-rich countries selling foreign exchange to Iran at artificially low prices. 
The relative ease of obtaining foreign exchange (either by resource exports 
or the underpricing of foreign exchange) shifts a country's comparative 
advantage away from manufacturers. 6 This interpretation seems consistent 
in Iran where little encouragement had been given to industry before the 1960s. 
To try to bridge the gap between the industrial and agricultural sectors, an 
aggressive import substitution policy complete with sophisticated systems of 
tariffs and quotas was adopted in the early 1960s.7 
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Source: Ahmad Kader, 'The Contribution of Oil Exports to Economic Development: A Study 
of the Major Oil Exporting Countries', The American Economist (Spring 1980), p. 50. 
When combined with political stability and rising oil revenues, profit 
expectations were such that the industrial sector grew at approximately twice 
the rate of other countries. In addition, investment incentives initiated by the 
government led to average annual growth rates for gross domestic capital 
formation and fixed investment in machinery and equipment of 16 and 20 per 
cent respectively during the Third (1963-67) and Fourth (1968-72) Plans.8 
While manufacturing prospered, the high tariffs on consumer goods, the 
over-valuation of the rial, and price controls on food undoubtedly were the 
critical factors leading to the slow growth of the agricultural sector. Real 
investment in agricultural machinery, for example, grew by only 6. 7 per cent 
between 1963 and 1971 compared with a similar rate of 20 per cent for total 
investment. 
A MODEL OF GROWTH AND MOMENTUM 
At least for the period before the 1970s, Nugent found a general tendency 
among developing countries ' ... for the aggregate growth rates of individual 
countries to be rather similar from one decade to the next' .9 Drawing on 
data for the 1950s and the 1960s Nugent found the majority of countries 
were either consistently higher or lower than the group average during 
each decade. For example, 15 of 42 countfies had GNP growth rates less 
than the group average in both decades, while 22 countries had growth rates 
above the group average in both decades. From this simple comparison, 
Nugent concluded that: 
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Once a certain degree of momentum for change and development has 
been attained, continued growth seems relatively easy to achieve. 
Without such momentum, however, the growth process seems relatively 
difficult to initiate and to sustain. 10 
In explaining the role of momentum in the growth process, Nugent drew 
on the theory of disequilibrium and suggested that many of the stabilizing and 
growth equalizing mechanisms assumed for the developed countries were often 
inappropriate in developing countries. Specifically, he suggested (a) the nature 
of technological selection and change, (b) the process of capital formation, 
and (c) the way in which human capital and income distribution tends to vary 
with growth, as the primary reasons why disequilibrium tends to be more 
prevalent in developing countries. 11 
At first glance, it appears that the case of Iran with a successful economic 
performance in the 1960s but with declining growth in the 1970s is an excep-
tion to the Nugent thesis. However, by examining the growth rates for the _ 
1960s and 1970s for 75 developing countries, we found no clear pattern between '"' 
the growth rate in the 1970s of four major economic aggregates (industrial 
production, manufacturing output, GDP, and government consumption) with 
the corresponding growth rate in the 1960s - an apparent rejection of the 
Nugent thesis. These results suggest that relatively high 1960s growth rates 
in a country such as Iran do not per se assure a similar performance in the 
next decade. 
A number of factors could have caused the disruption in the historical pat-
tern observed by Nugent - sudden balance of payments problems faced by 
previously high growth non-oil exporters, changes in comparative advantage, 
shifts in foreign aid, and so on. It could also be that the sustained pattern still 
existed through the 1970s but was masked by a situation where some extreme 
shift in domestic savings and/or investment had taken place. While these cases 
might be relatively few in number, they might have been sufficient to eliminate 
any statistical correlation between performance in the two time periods. 
To examine this thesis, we divided the set of developing countries into two 
homogeneous groups: (a) a relatively resource-unconstrained group where 
presumably once growth was established it would have a reasonable chance 
of continuing and (b) a relatively resource-constrained group with little 
chance of future growth. The grouping procedure was done twice. First of 
all countries were grouped on savings and investment measures. Presumably, 
unconstrained countries like Iran - with relatively fewer savings and invest-
ment constraints - would have a greater chance of sustained growth than 
the resource constrained countries. As a second step, countries were also 
grouped on the basis of foreign exchange resources. Once again, the relatively 
unconstrained group (which included Iran) - with little foreign exchange 
difficulties or balance of payments problems - would logically enjoy a greater 
chance of success in the following decade. 
An examination of the mean values of the two sets (Table 2) indicates that 
most developing countries are fairly consistent in that the better performers 
tend to rate high in all four categories (savings, investment, export and 
import growth) while those doing poorly do so in all categories. 
..,e, 
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As a next step we correlated the 1960s and 1970s growth rates of the major 
economic aggregates (industrial productions, manufacturing output, GDP, 
and government consumption) for the unconstrained countries. For these 
countries, we found that relatively high growth rates in the 1960s were good 
predictors of growth in the 1970s. 
TABLE2 
Mean Values of Variables in Country Groupings 
First Grouping U neons trained Constrained 
N = 31 N = 47 
Investment/GDP 1960 20.5 14.4 
1978 26.6 20.5 
Savings/GDP 1960 21.2 8.0 
1978 25.2 11.0 
Second Grouping Unconstrained Constrained 
N = 52 N = 23 
Import Growth 1970-78 9.1 OJo -2.80Jo 
Export Growth 1970-78 4.90Jo -2.90Jo 
On the other hand, countries which were grouped in the relatively resource 
constrained set did not follow this pattern. No significant correlations were 
observed between growth in the 1960s and growth in the 1970s. These results 
suggest that for this set of countries, momentum built up in one period is not 
a sufficient condition to ensure success in a later period. Whatever growth 
did occur in the 1960s seems to have been limited in the next decade by the 
inability to overcome savings, investment and foreign exchange deficiencies. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Based on the results of the analysis above, it appears that the factors which 
Nugent suggested might have aided Iran's expansion in the 1960s may have 
become self-terminating or even detrimental to growth by the mid-1970s. Iran's 
position in the high savings-investment group and the high import-export 
group suggests a high probability that its growth should have continued into 
the 1970s. Since Iran faced stagnation by 1978, one can conclude that either 
(a) extenuating political factors may have predominated, or (b) political 
uncertainty and erratic government policy toward the economy may have 
undermined the normal savings/investment relationships, or (c) it may well 
be that the type of momentum experienced by most developing countries is 
not the same for major oil and mineral exporters. 
Several recent studies12 have shown that development patterns for mineral 
and oil exporters are fundamentally different than for those countries not 
possessing these natural resources. When combined with the results obtained 
above, it suggests that we may need a separate theory of development and 
growth for this set of countries. Our results indicate that many rich areas 
remain for further research to understand the mechanisms of growth for the 
major Middle East oil exporters. 
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